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ABSTRACT New requirements from the customers’ and manufacturers’ point of view such as adding
new software functions during the product life cycle require a transformed architecture design for future
vehicles. The paradigm of signal-oriented communication established for many years will increasingly be
replaced by service-oriented approaches in order to increase the update and upgrade capability. In this article,
we provide an overview of current protocols and communication patterns for automotive architectures based
on the service-oriented architecture (SOA) paradigm and compare them with signal-oriented approaches.
Resulting challenges and opportunities of SOAs with respect to information security are outlined and
discussed. For this purpose, we explain different security countermeasures and present a state of the section
of automotive approaches in the fields of firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Identity and
Access Management (IAM). Our final discussion is based on an exemplary hybrid architecture (signal- and
service-oriented) and examines the adaptation of existing security measures as well as their specific security
features.
INDEX TERMS Automotive SOA, service-oriented architectures, connected vehicles, cybersecurity, fire-
wall, intrusion detection system (IDS), access control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern vehicles are transforming from hardware- to
software-defined platforms, making software the main driver
for new innovations. Among the functions that are only made
possible by software are, for example, increased road safety
through automated driving functions, better integration of
vehicles into everyday life through integration into the Inter-
net with app stores for users, and more ecological mobility
through electrification and sharedmobility services [1]. From
simple microcontrollers in the past, Electronic Control Units
(ECUs) are therefore also developing into highly sophisti-
cated computing machines that perform these advanced tasks
such as artificial intelligence for autonomous driving. The
electrical and electronical architecture (E/E architecture),
consisting of the ECUs, its networking and the software
running on it, is one of the key factors for new innovations
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in the automotive industry. This is also supported by the
expectation that the growth of the software and E/E market
will significantly exceed the growth of the entire automotive
market [2]. In order to support new technologies such as
connectivity, electrification, shared mobility or autonomous
driving, we experience a real paradigm shift in the field
of E/E architecture design [1]. Current vehicle architec-
tures have up to 150 ECUs [3] and roughly three million
implemented functions [4], which are interconnected via
bus systems such as Controller Area Network (CAN) and
organized by different domains (e.g., powertrain, chassis).
The previous highly ECU focused development methods
with statically defined transmitter-receiver dependencies at
design time are very limited with regard to extensions and
modifications [5], [6].
In order to increase the update and upgrade capabili-
ties of vehicle systems in the future, due to dynamic cus-
tomer requirements and market changes, future architectures
will be more centralized. For this transformation, SOAs are
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increasingly being introduced, which allow dynamic commu-
nication relationships at run time without static dependencies
mapped on ECUs [7]. SOAs are recognized as one of the
key elements to provide more flexibility, a better abstrac-
tion of low-level hardware and sensors and integration of
external services and on-demand functions [1]. In combina-
tion with the rise of standardized operating systems, SOA
allows dynamic, transparent and simplified access to infor-
mation throughout the entire vehicle ecosystem. Therefore,
if an application requires a sensor information, the informa-
tion is provided by an internal control unit of the vehicle
or over-the-air (OTA) by an Original Equipment Manufac-
turer (OEM)-backend for environmental data. Furthermore,
changes or the integration of new functions in vehicles that
are already in the field are much easier, since other informa-
tion or functions can be subscribed as services [6], [8].
Furthermore, new network technologies and protocols
are used to integrate this new communication paradigm.
The reliable CAN protocol [9] that has been used for
decades for internal vehicle communication is increas-
ingly being replaced by automotive Ethernet technology
in order to meet the changing requirements with respect
to data rate, interoperability and information security [2].
On higher layers 5-7 of the ISO/OSI model [10] proto-
cols like Scalable service-Oriented MiddlewarE over IP
(SOME/IP) or Data Distribution Service (DDS) are used,
which are specified in the AUTomotive Open System ARchi-
tecture (AUTOSAR) Adaptive standard [11]. While some of
these technologies are specific to the automotive industry,
together with generic computing platforms based on stan-
dardized operating systems, there is a general trend in the
evolution of E/E architecture towards ordinary IT network
architectures [12].
With the higher degree of connectivity as well as the
growing number of vehicle services [4], information secu-
rity requirements are also increasing significantly. Secu-
rity will become more and more a quality factor of
vehicles [13]. Attacks on previous vehicle architectures
(signal-oriented communication, mainly based on CAN pro-
tocol) have been demonstrated in recent years by various
publications [14]–[16].
As a result, the subject of automotive security has gained a
major focus within academic facilities, industry and standard-
ization committees. On the one hand, this has led to various
approaches from academia for countermeasures to protect
against vehicle attacks [17], [18]. On the other hand, various
standards and guidelines such as SAE J3061 [19], ISO/SAE
21434 [20] or AUTOSAR Secure Onboard Communication
(SecOC) [21] were specified.
A. PROBLEM
The change from signal-oriented to service-oriented com-
munication in vehicle architectures leads to a fundamen-
tal paradigm shift. Since communication design is no
longer exclusively statically specified, previous security mea-
sures cannot be directly adopted in SOAs. Dynamicity in
communication, rising data rates, a vast amount of new
protocols, the integration of third-party services and stan-
dardized software components pose new challenges and
requirements to automotive security measures. These were
not in the scope of security concepts for the former
signal-oriented E/E architectures.
B. SOLUTION
Existing security solutions used in the signal-oriented world
have to be examined for the transfer to the service-oriented
paradigm due to their changed communication characteris-
tics. Since signal-oriented approaches are partly based on
classic Information Technology (IT) measures, available IT
solutions for use in automotive SOAs should also be investi-
gated. The convergence of IT networks and E/E architectures
further motivates this approach.
C. CONTRIBUTION
We present a comprehensive overview of current standards,
protocols and developments in the field of automotive SOAs
and E/E architectures. In particular, we sketch the newly
emerging challenges for the security of SOAs. Furthermore,
we explain various security measures (firewalls, access con-
trols, IDSs) in general as well as approaches published
specifically for vehicles. In our discussion, we analyze the
applicability of existing approaches from the automotive
sector and IT for SOAs. For this purpose we elaborate the
deployment of the different security measures for an exem-
plary hybrid E/E architecture, which integrates the signal-
and service-oriented world. Finally, we identified necessary
research directions for future work to pave theway for a better
security of SOAs.
This work is structured as follows (s. also fig-
ure 1): In section II, we explain principles of signal-
and service-oriented communication in E/E architectures.
In section III, we provide information about existing auto-
motive protocols, vulnerabilities as well as attacks regard-
ing SOA security and outline deviations to classical IT.
Furthermore, section IV presents various countermeasures
and classifies research approaches published for automotive
networks. Section V includes an investigation and discussion
concerning the applicability of existing security approaches
in automotive SOAs. Finally, we summarize our work in
sectionVI and outline possible research topics for futurework
(s. section VII).
II. SERVICE-ORIENTED AND HYBRID E/E
ARCHITECTURES
The increased integration of service-orientation in the
E/E architecture creates new challenges for the cyber security
of vehicles. To evaluate the transferability of existing counter-
measures, it is necessary to clarify the differences between the
paradigms of signal-oriented and service-oriented communi-
cation. These differences manifest in terms of architecture
in general, the runtime stacks used and the communication
protocols.
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FIGURE 1. Structure of the research article.
A. E/E ARCHITECTURE
The distributed system of ECUs communicates via different
bus systems. Together, the network of interconnected bus
systems, ECUs and software running on them forms the
E/E architecture. The most relevant bus system technolo-
gies are CAN, Local Interconnect Network (LIN), FlexRay,
Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST) and Automo-
tive Ethernet. In current vehicles, multiple instances of any
of these technologies can be used. To give an example,
the E/E architecture of a 2019AudiA8 consists of sevenCAN
buses, one MOST bus and one FlexRay [23]. For diagnos-
tic purposes, an additional CAN bus and an Ethernet port
are included. Besides, various LIN and proprietary systems
are part of the architecture. LIN is especially used as very
low-cost option for connecting to simple devices such as seat
control. However, in this work we want to focus on future
architectures that will develop due to the main drivers for
innovation in automotive industry such as automated driving
and connectivity [24]. While today CAN is the dominant
system, the diversity of bus systems will decrease in the
future and Ethernet will take over the leading role in the vehi-
cle [25]. CAN will possibly still be used as a cost-effective
alternative for low data rates and high reliability. The hybrid
and hierarchical nature of future architectures, consisting of
both Ethernet and conventional bus systems is shared among
different researchers [6], [25]–[27]. In general CAN is used
today for the signal-oriented paradigm, whereas Ethernet is
mainly used for service-oriented communication.
1) CAN
CAN is a serial multi-master bus that supports different data
rates with a maximum of 1 MBits (High-speed CAN) and
with CAN with Flexible Data Rate (CAN-FD) [28] up to
about 8 MBits , depending on the physical transceiver. Modern
in-vehicle networks consist of multiple CAN buses, that are
interconnected via gateways and a backbone network, if nec-
essary [25]. Each message contains a unique Identifier (ID)
that defines the priority of a message. A message’s payload
is broken down into different signals of arbitrary length,
however the sequence of signals in a message with a specific
identifier is specified in the course of vehicle development.
On a specific CAN bus, a message with a specific ID is sent
by no more than one ECU. All ECUs in the vehicle network
can subscribe to any message ID. However, a gateway may
be needed to route the messages, if sending and receiving
ECU are attached to different buses. CAN messages are sent
cyclically, which is mostly used to realize control and feed-
back loops with multiple ECUs or event-based, usually for
interaction with the user (e.g., activation of the turn indicator,
window regulator). Finally, the transmission of a specific ID
can also be requested by another bus participant.
2) AUTOMOTIVE ETHERNET
Autonomous driving and connectivity increase the need
for bandwidth [1]. In addition to diagnostics and flash-
ing of ECUs, Ethernet is therefore increasingly used for
communication within the vehicle. In modern Ethernet net-
works, each participant communicates only with its con-
nected switch, which establishes collision-free point-to-point
connections between all connected devices. Special physical
layers are required for the vehicle to meet environmental
requirements such as freedom from interference. With the
100BASE-T1 standard [29] (formerly known as BroadR-
Reach standard) data rates of 100 MBit s are possible, with
1000BASE-T1 even 1 GBits [30]. Further increases in data
rates above 1 MBits were recently published [31]. To bridge
the gap of data rates between CAN-FD and the 100BASE-
T1 standard but still maintaining the low costs of CAN,
the 10BASE-T1S physical layer was specified [32], [33].
This can be a viable alternative to CAN for low-cost and
hard-realtime requirements in the future. As an extension
of the IEEE 802.1Q standard [34], Ethernet Time Sensitive
Networking (TSN) has been introduced to the automotive
domain to achieve higher real-time capability. Additionally,
the IEEE 802.1Q standard specifies so-called tagged Virtual
Local Area Networks (VLANs), that allow for logical sepa-
ration of sub-networks.
Above the automotive-specific physical layer, the IT stan-
dard protocol stack TCP/IP (Internet Protocol (IP), Trans-
mission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol
(UDP)) is used. Furthermore, automotive-specific protocols
such as Diagnostics over IP (DoIP) and SOME/IP were
introduced.
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TABLE 1. Comparison of AUTOSAR Classic and Adaptive platform. (adapted from [22].)
3) RUNTIME PLATFORMS
More and more the software architecture of ECUs is based
on different operating systems and standardized runtime
stacks [5]. For example, the average annual growth rate
of development efforts for operating systems and middle-
ware is expected to be as high as the growth rate of
development effort for automated driving functions [2]. The
most important ones are the two platforms specified by
the AUTOSAR foundation, namely AUTOSAR Classic and
AUTOSAR Adaptive [7], [11], [22]. The Classic Platform
is suitable for highest real-time requirements, whereas the
Adaptive Platform makes use of stronger computing power
and was designed to introduce the SOA paradigm to auto-
motive industry. The current standard to which this article
refers is Release 19-11. Between 2013 and 2016, the number
of ECUs with AUTOSAR increased from about 50 million
to almost 300 million [35]. Besides AUTOSAR, different
platforms for infotainment domain exist, e.g., GENIVI,1
QNX2 [5], [36]. We focus on AUTOSAR-based ECUs, since
these fulfill most of the safety-critical functions. A successful
attack on safety-critical functions (e.g., control steering [14])
can cause major harm to the vehicles passengers and their
surrounding. Thus, security for these platforms is also of great
importance. Table 1 sums up the major differences. From the
comparison, it can be seen that AUTOSAR Adaptive is far
more dynamic than the Classic Platform. Applications are
dynamically scheduled and installed. Furthermore, the Adap-
tive Platform relies on a subset of the standard POSIX inter-
face for embedded real-time systems. Thus, the interface for
all applications and software components to the machines
operating system is standardized. In addition, the paradigms
for communication of the applications via a network differ
between the Adaptive Platform and the Classic Platform.
Although the Classic Platform specifies the use of SOME/IP,
it does not support the SOA paradigm. Instead only a trans-
lation from signal-oriented CAN communication to Ethernet
is implemented, that defines a static mapping of signals to a
specific service.
4) EXEMPLARY FUTURE ARCHITECTURE
In figure 2, an exemplary E/E architecture of a future vehi-
cle is shown. The trend towards autonomous driving and
1GENIVI Alliance, https://www.genivi.org/
2BlackBerry Limited, https://blackberry.qnx.com/
connectivity leads to centralization and stronger computing
platforms [1], [7]. For example, a central computing cluster
is introduced that runs AUTOSAR Adaptive. The Adaptive
platforms may consist of multiple processors and ECUs that
are networked via switched Ethernet. The physical separa-
tion of functional domains (chassis, Advanced Driver Assis-
tance Systems (ADAS), infotainment, body) still exists in
our example, but for hierarchical Ethernet networks, this
separation can also be a virtual separation using a different
VLAN tag for each domain. The chassis and ADAS related
functions are connected in a hierarchical Ethernet topology to
the central unit. Since the functions must fulfill strict safety
and timing requirements, these platforms run AUTOSAR
Classic. For control functions with strong needs on reliability
and low cycle times, CAN may be used to connect the ECUs
to the switched Ethernet network. In our example, besides
the central cluster also the I/O cluster and the connectivity
control gateway are AUTOSARAdaptive platforms. External
communication is handled for smart charging, diagnostics
and wireless connectivity through the connectivity control.
In our example (s. figure 2), the AUTOSARClassic platforms
in the infotainment and body domain are connected via CAN
or LIN to the I/O cluster because infotainment and body
functions are mostly user I/O driven with low data rates.
Hence, the cheaper CAN / LIN is preferred to Ethernet.
Summing up, figure 2 outlines a hybrid architec-
ture of AUTOSAR Classic driven ECUs, that commu-
nicate mostly in signal-oriented paradigm via CAN and
the Adaptive platforms that form a SOA using Ether-
net. Furthermore, the architecture contains high-performance
POSIX-based computing clusters as well as low-performance
microcontrollers.
B. RELEVANT PROTOCOLS AND MIDDLEWARE
For automotive SOA, different protocols and middleware
approaches are relevant. Most important are SOME/IP and
DDS, since they are standardized in AUTOSAR and hence
available as first-class solution to the industry. Furthermore,
an approach from research for bringing SOA to CAN is
outlined.
1) COMMUNICATION PATTERNS
In signal-oriented and service-oriented communication, dif-
ferent communication patterns are relevant. The typical con-
trol flow of the patterns is shown in figure 3. Figures 3a to 3c
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FIGURE 2. Exemplary hybrid E/E architecture based on AUTOSAR Classic & Adaptive. ECU colors indicate the
respective bus systems they are attached to. (adapted from [7].)
FIGURE 3. Overview of communication patterns in automotive architectures.
show the typical patterns of a SOA. The publish-subscribe
pattern, the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) as well as the
fire-forget pattern are driven by the clients. Thus, data is only
transmitted to the clients if it is necessary. In comparison,
3d shows the signal-oriented communication, where the data
is published as broadcast disregarding if any subscriber is
present. However, the subscription to the publisher has to be
made statically.
Therefore the main difference between the communication
patterns of SOA and signal orientation is the time when
the communication path is configured (time, when client is
able to exchange data with the server). Generally, commu-
nication paths can be configured at design-time, at startup
of the vehicle or at run-time. In signal-orientation, the
configuration occurs fully static at design-time. It is specified,
which ECU is allowed to send payload by using a static mes-
sage ID. In addition, also the subscribers are assigned to IDs
at design-time. In comparison, the SOA paradigm allows for
configuration at startup or run-time.When the subscription to
a service is specified at design-time, the communication path
is instantiated at startup by just subscribing to the well-known
server(s) that provides the service. For runtime configura-
tion, a method to discover services and subscribe to them
is required. Figure 3e and 3f show two options for service
discovery. It can be either registry-based, where a dedicated
registry server handles the offering and finding of services,
or registry-less, where the discovery protocol enables servers
and clients to discover each other.
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2) SCALABLE SERVICE-ORIENTED MIDDLEWARE OVER IP
(SOME/IP)
The specification of SOME/IP is not only a communica-
tion protocol but rather a middleware and standardized in
AUTOSAR. Themiddleware simultaneously creates a certain
degree of abstraction between the application and the net-
work. For example, it is not necessary for an application to
know which ECU provides a desired function. If the func-
tion is integrated on the same ECU, a local connection is
established between the software components. If the function
is located on another ECU, the middleware establishes a
corresponding network link between two applications.
Communication Principles: The SOME/IP specification
defines three basic types for the communication between
clients and servers. Services in SOME/IP consist of events,
fields and methods.
• Events: Event-based communication in SOME/IP pro-
vides a way for clients to subscribe required information
from a provider. The provider is able to transmit the
information to the clients at a specified time interval or
if a value has been changed. In addition, various event
groups can be created which contain different fields for
subscribed clients.
• Fields: Services allow the definition of fields which
can be read or modified by clients using get- and set-
methods. In addition, they include the same notification
concept of Events. However, the usage between Fields
and Events is different, because fields are intended for
status-like properties that refer to a history, whereas
events shall be used for information that is only valid
for a short time.
• Methods: In addition, RPC are available. These allow a
client to execute a method provided by the server. There
are two different variants. With the first variant, a return
value is transmitted by the provider. With the fire-forget
option, the client does not receive a return value on call-
ing. Therefore this variant is mainly suitable for control
commands.
The publish-subscribe pattern is implemented by fields and
events. With the standard methods and get/set field methods,
the request-response pattern is included. Finally, the fire &
forget pattern can be fulfilled by SOME/IP methods using the
respective option.
In addition, the SOME/IP Service Discovery (SOME/IP-
SD) protocol allows for publication and subscription to events
and fields. If clients want to use certain services, these have
to be known or must be discoverable. The SOME/IP Service
Discovery (SOME/IP-SD) protocol provides two different
mechanisms to find or announce services, which are exe-
cuted during system startup. With offerService a provider can
announce his offered services as broadcast in the network.
On the other hand, findService allows clients to find certain
services that may not have been announced. SOME/IP-SD is
registry-based.
Transport: SOME/IP uses the TCP/IP or UDP/IP stack
for the transmission. To enable data exchange between
AUTOSAR Adaptive and Classic (Inter-Platform Communi-
cation), SOME/IP is specified for both platforms. This allows
a Classic ECU, which is additionally connected to legacy
bus systems such as CAN, to act as a gateway. Signals are
converted into a service in order to be able to offer it for
Adaptive ECUs. In case the Classic control unit does not pro-
vide SOME/IP communication, signal-to-service conversion
is only feasible on an Adaptive ECU.
3) DATA DISTRIBUTION SERVICE (DDS)
Another middleware that is recently used in automotive
industry is DDS [37] which is standardized by the Object
Management Group (OMG) and used across many indus-
tries. DDS is a data centric middleware based on the
publish-subscribe pattern to control the flow of data between
different nodes. Since Release 18-10 of theAUTOSARAdap-
tive Platform published in November 2018, the DDS standard
is implemented for automotive industry [11]. AUTOSAR
includes only a subset of the various DDS standard parts.3
Communication Principles: The Data-Centric Publish-
Subscribe (DCPS) interface of DDS organizes the data flow
in DDS based communication. The information that is pro-
duced is published as samples in different topics that are
identified by a unique name. A DDS communication consists
of one or more domains, that contain the various topics.
The domains are separated of each other, therefore no data
exchange between different domains is possible. One essen-
tial element of DDS is content and data rate filtering of the
published data for the subscriber of a topic. Hence, only data
of interest is published to a topic and transmitted via the
middleware. For example, only samples with a value > 300
and a message rate of five messages per second. The topics
form a logical global data space defining the datamodel. Each
topic is associated with a type, hence the middleware is able
to manipulate the data correctly and perform type checking.
The OMG specified also a remote procedure call stan-
dard via DDS to enable the use of a request-reply pat-
tern. This standard consists of a high-level abstraction on
top of DDS that re-uses the substantial parts of DDS to
define requesters as clients and repliers as services. In this
case, every request-reply connection consists of two topics,
a request topic and a reply topic. AUTOSAR Adaptive also
provides this concept to enable the RPC pattern via DDS.
Transport: Regarding the underlying data transport
model, Real-time Publish-Subscribe Protocol DDS Interop-
erability Wire Protocol (DDSI-RTPS) is used. DDSI-RTPS
specifies that at least the communication via UDP/IP has to
be supported by every DDS implementation, however most
vendors also provide a TCP implementation and also shared
memory access is possible. The use of further transport pro-
tocols is possible as long as the notion of specific unicast
addresses and ports is supported and incomplete or erroneous
314 DDS standards in May 2020.
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TABLE 2. Comparison of relevant protocols and middleware for automotive SOA.
messages are identified. In AUTOSAR, the DDS specifica-
tion allows the use of both UDP and TCP.
4) EMBEDDED SERVICE-ORIENTED COMMUNICATION
(eSOC)
The embedded Service-Oriented Communication protocol
outlined by Wagner et al. [38] introduces service-oriented
communication based on the CAN protocol. They specify
a 64 Bit service descriptor and a shorter 29 Bit identifer to
implement a SOA, that maintains the priority principles of
CAN and enables a simple integration with SOME/IP. The
short identifier fits into the standard CAN identifier, hence no
overhead is introduced by means of eSOC during operation.
During startup of an eSOC communication, the 64 Bit ser-
vice descriptor is used for service initialization via a register
server. The register server is not working as broker for the
communication, it only assigns the shortened identifier to the
service provider. The eSOC protocol supports publish / sub-
scribe and request / response as the two basic communication
principles. With the first one, information is sent event-based
or with a specific frequency from the server to the client.
Using the second principle, methods can be called remotely
and data can be exchanged as one-time transmission. An addi-
tional find/offer pattern allows for service discovery between
the requesting and providing ECUs.
C. COMPARISON
The main differences between the relevant protocols are
summarized in table 2. For comparison, the traditional
signal-oriented approach is also included here. The CAN
standard also specifies a request frame. However, this is
typically not used to implement a request-response pattern
in the traditional signal-oriented approach. The main differ-
ences manifest in the discovery of services if the discovery
protocols of SOME/IP and DDS are used. DDS is the most
dynamic, i.e. a subscriber only subscribes to a specific topic,
which means that no static link to a server is established.
Service IDs are invoked during discovery and the servers
are unknown at first. In contrast, SOME/IP is server-based
because a client must subscribe to events from a specific
server. In addition SOME/IP requires a system-wide map-
ping of services to specific ports on UDP/TCP and specified
service IDs during design time. However, AUTOSAR also
allows for a design- or startup time configuration of the
communication path for DDS and SOME/IP, if the discovery
protocols are not used.
III. SOA SECURITY
With the introduction of SOA in vehicle networks, new chal-
lenges arise with regard to existing security measures. On the
one hand, this can be attributed to the new protocol diversity,
on the other hand, the communication paths are no longer
statically defined. In the following sections we will describe
these issues in more detail.
A. PROTOCOLS
Previous communication protocols such as CAN were based
exclusively on OSI layer 1 & 2 (exception: diagnostic proto-
cols). In table 3, we classified common automotive network
protocols based on the ISO/OSI model. By using automotive
Ethernet on layers 1 & 2, conventional protocols from Classic
IT are used on layers 3 & 4 such as TCP/IP. In addition to
benefits such as better interoperability or higher bandwidths,
this development brings new risks with regard to information
security. Over the past few years, numerous hacker tools
have been developed in the IT world to simplify the use of
such techniques [39]–[41]. The amount of different protocols
used on Ethernet increases the complexity of networking and
packet handling and induces higher risks of protocol design
and implementation flaws. Hence, new vulnerabilities of the
protocol stack may be uncovered in the future [41]. Fur-
thermore, for protecting the information asset confidential-
ity, the protocols provide the feature to encrypt header- and
payload data on different OSI layers. Thus, when integrating
security measures, it has to be taken into account that certain
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TABLE 3. Common automotive protocols within the ISO/OSI model. (Diagnostics specific protocols are italicized.)
information may not be available on every network node
throughout the whole network path.
The security measures already included in the SOA pro-
tocols and signal-oriented communication are outlined in
table 2. For message authentication and freshness of mes-
sages in signal-oriented communication, the AUTOSAR
Classic standard introduced SecOC [21]. A message authen-
tication code as well as a freshness value are attached to the
payload of a message to prevent different attacks such as
replay and spoofing. For the the message authentication code,
a symmetric key is required. However, SecOC is a lightweight
protocol for low-cost embedded devices and does not allow
for encryption of the payload data on CAN. As SOME/IP and
DDS are included in AUTOSAR, they can rely on transport
layer protocols for security that are specified in AUTOSAR.
AUTOSAR Adaptive specifies the following concepts:
• DTLS for secure communication over UDP
• TLS for secure communication over TCP
• IPSec for secure communication over IP
However, SOME/IP does not provide any additional mea-
sures for security. One approach to address this issue was
presented by the researchers Iorio et al. [42], who provide
a security framework for Ethernet-based SOME/IP commu-
nication. In contrast, DDS includes an additional standard for
security [43]. With the additional DDS security measures,
access control, authentication, encryption and tagging of data
(e.g., ‘confidential’) is provided. The access control mecha-
nism enables the developer to separately grant read and write
permissions to DDS Domains and Topics.
B. NETWORK PATHS
In comparison to signal-oriented communication, the net-
work paths are only defined at system runtime or startup.
As a result, the ability to extract static characteristics (e.g.,
cycle times, routing tables) from the communication matrix
specified in development is only partially feasible. For this
reason, corresponding impacts on the design of security mea-
sures such as IDSs or firewalls have to be investigated (for a
detailed analysis, s. section IV). As a result, securing the vehi-
cle also involves these systems such as OEM back ends or the
infrastructure. Furthermore, it has also to be considered that
the system boundary (vehicle) is extended by externally used
OTA services. As a result, securing the vehicle also includes
these systems such as OEM-backend or infrastructure.
C. VULNERABILITIES
Since integration of SOA technology in vehicle architec-
tures is still in its infancy (e.g., Volkswagen MEB [44]),
no attacks of this kind are known at the time of this arti-
cle. However, appropriate security analyses can already be
performed for upcoming protocols and possible architec-
ture designs. A detailed article on SOME/IP presented by
Kreissl [45] included a threat analysis and risk assessment
as well as suggestions for appropriate countermeasures for
18 identified threats. Furthermore, the SOME/IP-TP proto-
col amendment (SOME/IP-Transport Protocol Segmentation
over UDP) was shown to be vulnerable for selective Denial-
of-Service attacks [46]. An early work analyzed the vulner-
abilities of the diagnostic protocol DoIP [47] and found it
to be vulnerable in various ways such as spoofing, denial-
of-service, or fingerprinting via OEM-specific fields in the
protocol. As outlined in section III-A, with standard pro-
tocols and operating systems, common vulnerabilities are
introduced. One example is the well-known buffer overflow
vulnerability caused by IP fragmentation, which may also
be found in an AUTOSAR implementation [46]. Another
example is the possibility to use ARP cache poisoning, if the
ARP table is not statically defined [48].
Besides the outlined threat analysis results we have to keep
in mind, that with the SOA also AUTOSARAdaptive is intro-
duced to the automotive domain as runtime platform.With the
standardized POSIX kernel and common operating systems,
also the vulnerabilities of the kernel and operating system
are common to all vehicles running the specific AUTOSAR
Adaptive Platform implementation [41]. Hence, any possible
vulnerability of the runtime platform has a larger impact to
industry than with OEM-specific runtime platforms.
D. AUTOMOTIVE ATTACKS
In order to secure future vehicle architectures, it is essen-
tial to investigate already known attacks regarding their
exploited vulnerabilities. The researchers Sommer et al. [49]
published a taxonomy for automotive attacks as well as a
database containing 162 published attacks [50]. The tax-
onomy contains 23 different categories and multiple lay-
ers of abstraction such as a short description of the attack,
violated security properties or an explanation of exploited
vulnerabilities. Since attacks of vehicles usually consist of
several attack steps, the database also provides an extended
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version, which contains 413 sub-steps of captured attacks.
Based on this information, detailed attack analyses [51] can
be performed. Besides academic institutions, there are also
commercial repositories for automotive incidents provided
by industry [52], [53]. The datasets of these repositories not
only focus exclusively on attacks in vehicles but also include
known vulnerabilities in backends or vehicle apps.
Furthermore, the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe (UNECE) WP.29 Working Party on Automated
and Connected Vehicles (GRVA) [54] is expected to come
into force in 2021, which will be the first regulation concern-
ing information security in vehicles. The regulation will be
mandatory for all OEMs of the associated member states for
International Whole Vehicle Type Approval (IWVTA) [55]
of new vehicles. In addition, a list of high-level threats and
vulnerabilities as well as a mapping to real attack methods
based on vehicle systems is included.
Vehicles with a mature SOA or hybrid architecture are
currently not very often found on the roads. Accordingly,
no attacks focusing specifically on SOA have yet become
public. Nevertheless, due to known vulnerabilities of SOA
technologies (see Section III-C) and successfully performed
attacks on previous vehicle architectures, future SOAs will
most likely be exploited and attacked. Especially due to the
increasing spread of SOA technology, the exploitation of
vulnerabilities is only a matter of time.
E. COMPARISON TO IT SECURITY
Although there is a trend in in-vehicle networks towards
common IT networks in terms of physical (i.e. Ethernet) net-
working, there are still major differences that need to be taken
into account in automotive security measures [12]. These
specific requirements are not new to SOA but are generic
to automotive security. However, the gained dynamics and
flexibility of the networking of a SOA comes at the expense
of the static predefinition of the network traffic. This was
one of the advantages of automotive networks in terms of
security compared to IT networks, because static behavior
allows simple rule-based control [56].
In general, security for conventional IT networks does not
have to worry about safety-critical systems, while failing
automotive security is responsible for physical damage in the
worst case. For example, taking over the steering or power-
train functionality can have a direct physical impact, which
is why particularly high security precautions must be taken
here. Closely related to this are the requirements for determin-
ism and real-time of the security measures [57]. For example,
a firewall that erroneously blocks a brake command by a false
alarm or delays it too much by a slow analysis are not suitable
for use in a vehicle. Another difference between IT security
and vehicle security is the user interaction. While in IT every
user can be confronted with security measures on his personal
device, automotive security must run completely automati-
cally in the background. In contrast to IT, a user reactionwhile
driving is not possible here. Finally, the automotive-specific
protocols and technologies (e.g., CAN, DoIP, SOME/IP) and
system platforms (e.g., AUTOSAR Classic and Adaptive)
require tailor-made solutions. Where common IT technology
is used (e.g. infotainment systems), common IT security
measures may also be sufficient. However, with increasingly
centralized E/E architectures, a clear separation between
safety-critical or automotive-specific systems and generic IT
components is not always possible.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
The protection of IT networks and automotive archi-
tectures should generally follow the defense-in-depth
principle [61]–[63]. This approach is based on the integration
of different protection layers to minimize the risk of a suc-
cessful attack. Therefore, an attacker has to overcome several
protection mechanisms to intrude into the system completely.
In this article, we focus on countermeasures of firewalls, IDSs
as well as IAM and examine below their applicability for
service-oriented architectures.
A. FIREWALLS
Firewalls are part of the access control group and used in
IT as an integral part to implement previously defined secu-
rity strategies in the form of access restrictions [61], [64].
According to RFC 4949 [65], a firewall represents a gate-
way that allows data traffic between two different networks
(e.g., the internet and internal company network) to protect
resources against threats from other networks. Over the last
decades different types of firewall systems have been estab-
lished, which are divided into different classes (packet filter,
proxy and application-level) [66] and shown in table 4. These
filtering types can be used in different architectures and are
often integrated as a combination of them.
Classic firewall packet filters are based on OSI layers
three and four (network and transport layer). This allows the
integration of filter tables based on protocol information of
these layers to enforce predefined access control policies.
An extension of the static packet filters are dynamic ones.
These are able to store already analyzed packet information
in order to consider them in subsequent filter decisions [64].
This type of filter is also called stateful filter, because access
decisions depend on past behavior.
Proxy firewalls, which also work on the transport level
of the ISO/OSI model, represent a further development. The
firewall works as a broker between two networks and pro-
vides only a certain amount of services that a client can
access, for example, from a network to another. This allows
defining the amount of services in the firewall for each client.
Compared to packet filters, special context information can
be included in the rules [61]. It is also possible to limit the
number of simultaneous links and throughput rates to avoid
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
The application filters (application firewall) are specified
on the top level of the ISO/OSI model (application layer).
This type extends the filtering capabilities of the proxy fire-
wall through precise information about the applications used.
Therefore these filters are able to analyze application-specific
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TABLE 4. Overview about established firewall types.
TABLE 5. Classification of reviewed automotive Firewalls.
TABLE 6. Classification of reviewed automotive IDS (adapted from [17]).
user data (Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)), because for each
application a dedicated proxy within the firewall is pro-
vided [67]. Furthermore, an authentication between the
user (client) and the proxy can be established to make spoof-
ing attacks more difficult [61]. Depending on the imple-
mentation variant, these firewall types are also capable of
performing certain IDS features.
1) AUTOMOTIVE FIREWALLS
In recent years, the firewall technology of traditional IT has
also become interesting for the automotive domain. A clas-
sification of the following reviewed approaches is shown
in table 5. In 2014, Seifert and Obermaisser [18] presented
a gateway firewall for time- and event-triggered as well as
stream communication. The authors used a hierarchical timed
automata to describe the different communication behaviors.
For example, they defined an interarrival time with min and
max thresholds for event-triggered communication in CAN
networks or dynamic parts of FlexRay to detect deviations
of them. They also explained that the presented approach
explicitly works for a statically defined communication.
Another firewall approach was published by
Pesé et al. [58], who considered both software and hard-
ware aspects as well as specific automotive requirements.
For the detection of attacks they used three different filter
types. A classic packet filter was implemented on a Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), whereas the rate-limiting
and stateful packet inspection were software-based. Their
evaluation contains investigations on end-to-end latency and
jitter, throughput, memory consumption and CPU load. Fur-
thermore, the authors consider it possible to extend the
approach for filtering DoIP or SOME/IP protocols on appli-
cation level.
Another gateway firewall design presented by Holle and
Shukla [59] for an automotive Ethernet switch includes
packet and application filter. However, the authors do not
explain the precise details about these filtering techniques.
In addition, they provide an overview of future Ethernet archi-
tectures and illustrate the necessity for integrating firewalls.
The researchers Luo and Hou [60] performed a risk anal-
ysis for potential attacks by using an attack tree. For this
purpose they analyzed different attack vectors (e.g., sensors,
ECUs, interfaces) and calculated the probabilities of exposure
based on the identified attack paths. Based on this, they
derived a security concept for a gateway firewall including
stateful packet filter and IDS features by using information
entropy techniques. They also point out the limitation that
traditional embedded real-time operating systems do not sup-
port any kind of access control and integrate a Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) on their used FreeRTOS.
B. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
Compared to firewalls or encryption methods, which are
defined as proactive measures, IDSs are assigned to reactive
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protection measures [17], [61], since IDSs detect possible
attacks onlywhen they occur. In contrast, pro-activemeasures
are intended to preventively minimize the potential attack
surface of the system. For detection of attacks, IDSs analyze
data traffic in networks, evaluate system log files or examine
user behavior. A basic distinction is made between host-based
and network-based, depending on their location [61], [66].
Host-based IDS (HIDS) are used exclusively on workstations
or servers to detect anomalies within this system bound-
ary. An anomaly could be an attempt by an user to modify
system-critical files or generally to bring the system into a
risky state.
In addition, network-based IDS (NIDS) analyze the data
streams within networks by creating a copy of all packets
in order to check these with regard to protocol deviations or
malicious user data. The detection techniques of both systems
can be divided into two different types. Signature-based
techniques are based on features extracted from already
known attacks and regularly updated. However, this implies
the limitation that only very similar attacks can be detected.
In contrast, new types of attacks remain partially undetected.
On the other hand, anomaly-based methods detect devia-
tions in relation to predefined features that are extracted
from a normal behavior. Statistical, protocol-specific,
rule-based and heuristic techniques are often used for this
purpose [61].
1) AUTOMOTIVE IDS
In addition to traditional IT, there is also an increasing
research effort on IDS approaches for vehicles to detect
attacks at an early stage as well as to support pro-active
countermeasures such as firewalls. Due to growing dynamic
communication parts within automotive architectures, with
protocols like SOME/IP, firewalls based on static filter tables
are not able to ensure sufficient security [59]. Furthermore,
the already mentioned UNECE WP.29 specifically calls for
the integration of in-vehicle IDS. An overview of such
approaches for the automotive domain described below is
shown in table 6.
An early work by Müter et al. [56] introduced eight dif-
ferent anomaly detection sensors (e.g., formality, location,
plausibility of messages) to identify intrusions on the CAN
bus. Especially, they compared the applicability of the sen-
sors with respect to six different criteria, e.g., if the sensor
can be developed only based on the vehicles specification
or if messages of different bus systems need to be consid-
ered for detection. In recent years, various features have
been developed which allow the detection of anomalies.
A comprehensive survey for intra-vehicle IDS approaches
was published by Al-Jarrah et al. [17] in 2019. According
to their detailed analysis, three main categories were identi-
fied for classification the works (flow-based, payload-based,
hybrid). For each main category, seven characteristics (tech-
nique, features, dataset, attack type, performance metrics and
benchmark models) were defined to allow comparability. The
authors also analyzed in more detail the features used for
intrusion detection. Vehicles differ from classic IT by the
fact that they consist of a composition of sensors, process-
ing logic and actuators. In addition, they have interfaces to
external systems (e.g., OEM backend). Therefore, vehicles
can be defined as a Cyber-Physical System (CPS). Compared
to IT, besides cyber features, which there are also physical
features for detection. Cyber features include protocol and
communication properties (e.g., cycle time, message length)
[68], [69]. In contrast, physical features (e.g., speed, location,
signal courses) can be used to determine the current vehicle
state [70], [71]. According to the review of 42 IDS publica-
tions in [17], 81% used cyber features, 5% physical and 10% a
mixture of both. However, there are further approaches based
on physical features which use physical characteristics (e.g.,
voltage courses of transmitted bits, characteristic impedance)
of sender/receiver and transmission channel [72], [73].
Furthermore, Grimm et al. [12] provide a classification
for security monitoring within the automotive domain by
defining three aspects (vantage, operational area, action).
Each aspect includes different categories such as external
communication or sub-network root. Each category is then
assigned to automotive network representatives (e.g., cen-
tral gateway, backbone network, network switch ECU on
Ethernet). In addition, they also outline that IDS research
today is focused on the signal-oriented communication, and
only few works tackle intrusion detection for Ethernet and
SOA.
C. IDENTITY- AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT (IAM)
An access control can generally be defined as automated
prevention of unauthorized access from subjects to resources.
Furthermore, certain rules (policies) can be specified to con-
trol and enforce this purpose. Therefore an access control
ensures a rule-compliant use of resources. Over the last
decades of the IT century, various access control models for
authorization have been developed or extended accordingly.
The models control which subject (e.g., user or service) in a
system is authorized to access a specific resource/object (e.g.,
file, service). The access can be granted on different autho-
rization levels (read, write, execute), which are defined by
access policies for each subject or resource. In the following,
the four most significant access control models are presented
in a chronological order.
1) DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)
In theDAC, the owner is exclusively responsible for assigning
permissions to a resource [67]. For example, in a company
this instance could be a head of department who owns a lot
of data. In order to assign and manage the permissions of
each subject, an Access Control List (ACL) is mapped to each
resource, which defines the access rights [61].
2) MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC)
The Mandatory Access Control (MAC) provides an access
model for strictly controlling and enforcing permissions.
Compared to DAC, permissions on resources are not mapped
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to subjects, but rather security labels are assigned [61].
The labels may contain different levels of security (public,
confidential, secret or top secret). At the same time, these
labels are also assigned to the participating subjects of an
organization. If a subject wants to access a resource, a central
instance checks whether both have the appropriate label or
security level.
3) ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)
With Role-based Access Control (RBAC), authorizations are
assigned as a set to specific roles. For example, the roles can
correspond to different departments (purchasing, shipping,
board ofmanagement) of a company. This eliminates the need
to assign individual authorizations for each subject or object.
The control and enforcement of RBAC is done centrally on a
system or network. If a new employee is hired, he or she only
has to be assigned to one role and thus receives the stored set
of authorizations. In addition, this reduces the administrative
effort of the responsible IT staff member, since changes can
be made at a central location [61].
4) ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (ABAC)
The basic idea of the Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC)
approach is to allow or deny access to resources of service
users via attributes [74], [75]. A distinction is made between
the following attributes:
• User attributes: Describe the service user in more detail
(e.g., age, department, title).
• Action attributes: Describe the action performed on the
resource (e.g., read, write, delete).
• Resource attributes: Describe the object that is accessed,
e.g., bank account, document.
• Environment attributes: Attributes that relate to time,
place or dynamic aspects of the access control scenario
deal, for example, with access permissions only to cer-
tain times.
By applying attributes, the rigid coupling between users
and roles as well as roles and authorizations (s. RBAC)
designed more flexible.
To fulfill the dynamic requirements of distributed systems,
a dynamic access control decision is needed. For this purpose
the user attributes are evaluated at runtime and compared with
a stored security policy. This enables defining permissions
without prior knowledge of specific subjects [74]. If a subject
wants to access an object (1), the ABAC module checks
whether the access is allowed based on the policy (2) and
enforces the access decision (3) (allow, block) accordingly.
Therefore it is no longer necessary to specify an individual
subject. The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) standard [76] is recommended for implementa-
tion. Furthermore, the standard supports the integration of
subject and object attributes within access policies, which are
the core of ABAC. The XACML architecture and associated
modules define the authorization infrastructure necessary for
an ABAC model.
5) ACCESS CONTROL TECHNIQUES
For access control models already mentioned, there are basi-
cally two different techniques for mapping access permis-
sions to subjects and objects. Both variants can be specified
using an access control matrix (s. table 7) [61]. This type is
usually used with the DAC model. The permissions can be
mapped either to the capabilities or to the objects (ACL).
a: CAPABILITY TABLE
This type of table specifies a set of permissions for a partic-
ular subject [77]. In table 7, the capabilities for each subject
are defined horizontally for the three different objects (file
1, 2, 3). A capability can be represented by different formats
(token, key or ticket). If a subject wants to access an object,
the underlying system or application checks whether the
permissions within the transferred capability are sufficient for
the requested action.
b: ACCESS CONTROL LIST
This lists are mostly used within operating systems, appli-
cations or network devices (e.g., switches, routers). These
include entries of different subjects who are authorized to
access a certain object with defined permissions [61]. Fur-
thermore, ACLs are also used in RBAC to assign permissions
for objects to specific roles.
6) AUTOMOTIVE IAM
Until the introduction of AUTOSAR Adaptive 18-03 in
2018 [78], a comprehensive IAM for vehicular embedded
systems was missing, with the exception of diagnostic appli-
cations. For this kind of functions a lightweight access control
exists by using the Security Access service [79]. This service
provides an authentication and authorization procedure for
diagnostic applications based on challenge-response princi-
ple. For initiating an extended diagnostics session, an external
diagnostics device sends a request to an in-vehicle ECU.
Thereupon, the ECU responds with a random number to
the diagnostics device, which calculates a key by using a
secret algorithm. Subsequently, the device sends this key to
the ECU, which checks the correct calculation and thus the
validity of the authentication. As a final step, the autho-
rization is performed by granting the execution of extended
diagnostic services. However, this procedure has to be con-
sidered as unsecure, since various research studies have
already shown its weaknesses and resulting vulnerabilities
[15], [80], [81]. Through the integration of a fine-grained
IAM, many of the exploited vulnerabilities of vehicles would
have been avoided [45].
For these reasons, in recent years there has been increased
academia research on approaches as well as specifica-
tion efforts for managing permissions in vehicles.The
approaches presented below are classified in table 8. In 2016,
Kim et al. [82] published an decentralized approach for an
authorization management by integrating an ABAC mod-
ule into the AUTOSAR Classic Platform. The predefined
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TABLE 7. Access control matrix for illustrating ACLs and capabilities (adapted from [61]).
TABLE 8. Classification of reviewed automotive IAM.
attributes consist of CAN message, ECU service, and envi-
ronment properties, which are used to create access control
lists on each network node.
Another approach regarding a policy-based secure com-
munication was presented by Hamad [83]. They focused on
a trustworthy creation of security policies during the entire
development process with various stakeholders (OEM and
Tiers). The policies include certain specifications (e.g., secu-
rity properties such as integrity or security protocol require-
ments) for provided or required services interfaces within
a software component. Furthermore, a security module was
introduced for each ECU, which acts as a distributed proxy
firewall for in-vehicle TCP/IP communication. This allows
fine-grained access control of each application to the under-
lying network stack based on stored policy.
The authors Gupta and Sandhu [84] focus their research
on the increasing connectivity of the vehicle with its envi-
ronment and the resulting risk for possible security vulnera-
bilities. For this the authors first explain different vehicular
Internet of Things (IoT) architectures based on clouds and
fogs. They further explain the structure of their authorization
frameworks including different level and types of access
control approaches (ACLs, CapBAC, ABAC) for static and
dynamic communication. In addition, they illustrate their
approaches based on use cases such as single cloud and multi
cloud scenarios.
An overview and analysis of traditional (e.g., DAC or
MAC) as well as modern access control models (e.g.,
CapBAC, Task-Role-Based Access Control (T-RBAC),
Privacy-Aware Role-Based Access Control (P-RBAC)) with
focus on CPS were published by Lopez and Rubio [85].
The authors identify requirements for access controls based
on an exemplary future industrial system. Furthermore, they
analyzed the applicability of existing access controls by intro-
ducing a comparison criteria such as dynamicity, scalability
or flexibility, which are rated with high, medium or low.
With the introduction of AUTOSAR Adaptive, an IAM
module was specified. This module enables a comprehen-
sive rights management based on services. In detail, for
each application or service (subjects) a list of access per-
missions for other resources or services (objects) can be
assigned. Thus the AUTOSAR Adaptive specification is
based on a capability-based access control. If a service wants
to access an associated object during runtime, the modules
Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) are specified for controlling and enforcing the per-
missions outside of applications and services. Furthermore,
AUTOSAR Adaptive offers the possibility to use the inte-
grated fine-grained access control of the supported DDS
protocol for Domains and Topics.
An approach for the integration of a dynamic access
control into an automotive middleware was published by
Hugot et al. [86]. The authors first explain the previous weak-
nesses of automotive ECUs with regard to access manage-
ment. Furthermore, they specify requirements for an access
control (controls should be performed on OSI layer 5 and
higher, middleware should control services depending on
current vehicle state). As an example, the authors refer to
an Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) which is only allowed to
communicate with a Transmission Control Module (TCM)
when switched on. The presented approach is based on a
dynamic MAC, which controls information flows between
source and destination as well as their sequences by using
a state machine. They also show the integration of their
approach into the SOME/IP protocol by explaining and eval-
uating three different methods.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we explain potential challenges and benefits
of security measures mentioned in section IV for the inte-
gration in SOAs. The analysis and discussion is based on
the hybrid E/E architecture and different deployment points
shown in figure 2.
A. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS/REMARKS
When securing networks, it can generally be noted that pre-
dominantly static communication (signal-oriented) is easier
to secure than dynamic communication (service-oriented).
This can be argued with the fact that static communication
does not change during runtime. For example, no new net-
work nodes are added and the nodes send predefined mes-
sages based on a specification. For the configuration of a
firewall or IDS, this means that filter rules or normal behavior
can be derived directly from the specification. This paradigm
change based on SOAs also brings new challenges in other
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domains such as the traditional IT [87]. For this reason,
we believe it is essential to examine the requirements for new
systems to determine whether dynamic communication is
absolutely necessary or a static specification is also feasible.
In general, when securing a new E/E architecture, a threat
and risk analysis [88] should be performed first in order
to derive appropriate security measures. However, in this
article we want to analyze certain measures regarding sig-
nal and service-oriented communication without integrating
them into a specific one.
For a more precise analysis of the different security mea-
sures we make the following assumptions:
• An OEM backend server has always the same and static
network address from the vehicle point of view.
• The signal/service mapping is statically defined.
• The OBD interface is used by various external devices.
B. FIREWALLS
Traditional IT firewall techniques have existed for over
25 years and were introduced as a countermeasure for secu-
rity design flaws in protocols and software. Firewalls can
be classified as measures which do not solve the existing
shortcomings of today’s communication protocols. Rather,
they attempt to limit the impact of these shortcomings through
additional inspections. However, there is a risk that an
attacker could bypass these additional controls and exploit
persistent protocol weaknesses [67]. Moreover, firewalls are
not able to perform semantic checks on the data. Only
application-level firewalls are capable of detecting signatures
based on already known attack techniques. However, they
are not able to check safety-critical messages in real time as
well as to take into account the current vehicle condition with
respect to the context [86]. If an end-to-end encryption (e.g.,
on layer 7) is used, it should also be noted that a firewall is
not able to inspect the data on this layer.
Transferred to future automotive networks, design flaws
of classic IT should not be adopted by using secure proto-
cols. Therefore it is necessary that network protocols are able
to ensure information security assets such as confidentiality,
integrity/authenticity and availability on different ISO/OSI
layers. It should also be considered whether firewalls in com-
bination with secure protocols is the best solution (due to the
limitations mentioned above and the purposes for which they
were used in the past) or whether other measures available
today are more appropriate.
For a more detailed analysis of firewall protection capabil-
ities, we have examined the three deployment points below:
1) CLASSIC/ADAPTIVE PLATFORM GATEWAY
At this point the transformation of service and signal-oriented
communication is performed. Coming from the service direc-
tion, each service is statically assigned to specific messages
and their payloads. This allows the filtering of statically
known assignments and ranges of signal values. In reverse
direction, the gateway acts as a service provider in order to
provide signal information from legacy device (e.g., engine
speed, wheel speed) as a service to clients of the AUTOSAR
Adaptive platform. From the perspective of a firewall, filter-
ing is more challenging. In principle, any client is able to
subscribe services (assuming the client has necessary permis-
sions). This means that source IP addresses are not perma-
nently static and predictable during the runtime. Therefore
classical packet filters (OSI layer 3,4) are not suitable. There
is only the possibility to filter certain properties based on
higher protocols like SOME/IP or DDS. However, it should
be considered whether application-related filtering can be
performed comprehensively within firewalls at all or whether
this should not be solved by using IAM features.
2) CONNECTIVITY ECU
Considering the interface on-board/off-board communication
within the connectivity gateway, different possibilities for
firewall filtering can be identified depending on external
network nodes. In the first use case we analyze a connection
between a vehicle and anOEMbackend. In principle, filtering
on ISO/OSI layers 3 and 4 could be performed. In detail it
would be conceivable to block all IP addresses except the
static IP of the backend. In addition, a restriction of allowed
ports could be integrated in a more fine-granular manner.
3) OBD-GATEWAY
At this point, various external network participants are able
to establish a connection to the vehicle’s internal network.
Examples are diagnostic devices from different manufactur-
ers as well as On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) dongles allow-
ing a connection to a smartphone or third-party backend.
If the DoIP protocol is used for diagnostics, a dynamic IP
address is assigned to each external device. This means that
filtering on certain IP-addresses is not generally feasible.
If a device is connected, a white-list can be activated which
blocks all other IP addresses during this session. Furthermore,
a restriction of available ports could be implemented on OSI
layer 4. It should be noted that different applications could
use the same port. In case the CAN protocol and correspond-
ing transport protocol ISO TP is used for diagnostics, other
aspects have to be considered. This impedes the integration of
rate-limiting features due to the separation time or amount of
consecutive frames without flow control. Moreover, it has to
be ensured that different diagnostic services can be requested
in parallel e.g., with the same CAN ID (End-of-Line
scenario).
C. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
To date, IDS in the automotive sector has mainly focused on
detecting anomalies on the signal-basedCANbus, while SOA
and Ethernet are not considered. The discussion on IDS for
automotive SOA has to include four major differences and
challenges in contrast to CAN. One point is, it is of impor-
tance what network data and features shall be analyzed, since
the nature of the data differs to the signal-oriented paradigm.
Furthermore, the deployment and placement strategy needs
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TABLE 9. Applicability of in-vehicle anomaly detection sensors [56] - adopted and discussed w.r.t. SOA requirements.
to be discussed, because the architecture itself changes due
to SOA. This also leads to the third point, the necessity of
host-based detection in addition to network-based detection.
Lastly, besides anomaly based IDS also signature-based IDS
can be of interest.
1) FEATURES FOR (SOA NETWORK) INTRUSION DETECTION
Lots of CAN intrusion detection systems focus on pay-
load analysis, which is possible since the data rates on
CAN are low, and the structure of the payload is specified
during vehicle development. Besides analyzing the signals,
Al-Jarrah et al. [17] also mention the flow-based analy-
sis. In traditional IT, this is the most common method to
network-based IDS [89], where the features the IDS observes
are captured at OSI layers 2 or 3. For the automotive SOA on
Ethernet with multiple layers, headers, encryption and larger
payloads in comparison to CAN, payload based inspection is
not feasible. Hence, it makes sense to use flow-based IDS
for Ethernet and SOA in automotive architectures. Indeed,
the features an automotive SOA flow should contain are
unclear today. In comparison, Müter et al. [56] formulated
the information that should be observed for automotive IDS,
especially for anomaly based detection on the CAN bus. They
outlined eight so-called sensors and compared them w.r.t.
their applicability. We analysed which sensor are also appli-
cable to the SOA and what challenges arise in using them.
The results are shown in table 9. As outlined above, payload
analysis is difficult, thus the sensorsRange, Plausibility and
Consistency are not feasible in general on the network level.
For information on sensor/actor level, where the range is
limited by physical constraints and data rates are medium,
the sensor are still feasible. The publish-subscribe and
request-response communication schemes are not any more
driven by specification of the sender, but driven by data or the
requester. Thus, for SOA the Range, Frequency and Protocol
are not specified beforehand (marked in orange color), mak-
ing the analysis more difficult (e.g., requiring machine learn-
ing techniques).Formality of the data is still specified to some
extent, but less than for signal-orientation (more protocols
with more degrees of freedom, e.g., message size). Hence,
detection capabilities are also lower. In addition, the crite-
rion Number of Bus Systems makes no sense to SOA, since
the whole architecture is one hierarchical Ethernet topology.
Thus, for SOA this criterion should e.g., consider the number
of flows, number of data topics or VLANs under analysis.
Then, the Location is a valid sensor to identify e.g., VLAN
hopping. Nevertheless, location may not be feasible because
with any newly introduced service in the vehicle, with an
updated service requesting further data, or even on every
startup, new communication paths are established. Hence,
also the benign locations (i.e. benign communication paths)
are highly dynamic. This is basically the same for the Cor-
relation sensor. Summing up the comparison, lots of sensors
can not be simply transferred to SOA or make no sense any
more. Instrumenting each service with monitoring capabil-
ities would be the same as payload based analysis, which
is not feasible. Hence, intelligent features on middleware
layer are necessary to develop suitable network based IDS for
automotive SOA. Nevertheless, the features must be generic
to all SOA middlewares so that they can be implemented
throughout the industry. Besides the features of flow-based
IDS in IT, we suggest to include features capturing Quality
of Service (QoS) parameters (derived from SOA middleware
or from Ethernet protocols), as QoS parameters are means
to specify the priority of data and separate data of different
criticality. Another interesting option would be to include
statistical measures on the payload that do not require deep
packet inspection (e.g., information entropy [90]) because
these could also be computed on encrypted traffic and induce
low computational overhead.
2) SIGNATURE-BASED AND HOST-BASED DETECTION
On the one hand, with standardized operating systems and
common well-known IT protocols, future attacks on vehi-
cles may target more than one vehicle type or manufacturer.
On the other hand, shared knowledge on threats and vul-
nerabilities such as Auto-ISAC [53] enables the industry to
develop attack signatures. Hence, in the future it is more
feasible for Ethernet and automotive SOA than for CAN and
the signal-oriented paradigm to use signature-based detec-
tion. This would complement the anomaly-based detection,
enabling the car detecting known as well as unknown attacks
with higher accuracy. In addition, with standardized POSIX
operating systems, dynamic scheduling of processes and the
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introduction of third-party services into vehicles, host-based
intrusion detection must come into the focus of research
and industry. Here, more dynamics are introduced also on
the software and application layer with the introduction of
SOA, not only on the network. Having in mind, that pay-
load analysis or monitoring of each service on the network
is not feasible, the observation of host behavior becomes
even more important. The AUTOSAR foundation also paid
attention to host-based IDS, as the coming IDS standard
already defines some host-based monitoring capabilities for
AUTOSAR-based ECUs [91].
3) DEPLOYMENT
Addressing the last point of the discussion, from an architec-
tural point of view, CAN IDS can be deployed anywhere on
the bus, since all data is broadcasted. On Ethernet and SOA,
the deployment must consider the availability of the data and
stronger computing resources for higher data rates. Hence,
in our exemplary architecture in figure 2 for network-based
detection all data has to be made available to the IDS. To give
an example, the data exchanged between the Camera and the
ESP ECU can not be observed in the central computing clus-
ter, as (in comparison to CAN) the switches establish unicast
communication between the ECUs. The relevant ECUs for
capturing the network data are the ECUs that contain the
switches. Either the switches (in hardware) or the respective
ECU (in software) have to calculate flow information on Eth-
ernet and the communication of services in our SOA. In addi-
tion, the connectivity ECU is required to capture the network
behavior with regard to the external communication. After-
wards the calculated flow information can be collected and
analysed on one of the Adaptive platforms high-performance
controllers.
Thus, a decentralized monitoring of the SOA commu-
nication behavior all over the vehicles network with a
decentralized or centralized IDS e.g., on the Central Com-
puting Cluster enables us to observe the whole SOA with
sophisticated analysis techniques such as machine learning.
Monitoring and IDS systems for CAN and signal-oriented
communication should still be deployed additionally on
the Classic/Adaptive Platform Gateways, because signal-
to-service mapping is performed here and the high-frequency
real-time control commands can be observed. However,
the integration of CAN IDS and SOA IDS into a
vehicle-monitoring approach is still in its infancy. Never-
theless, the currently ongoing standardization of Intrusion
Detection Systems for vehicles [91] provides the technologi-
cal foundation to implement these monitoring capabilities.
D. IDENTITY- AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT
An analysis based on the database from Sommer et al. [49]
indicates that no or only a limited and weak IAM (diagnos-
tics) has been implemented on ECUs in the past. As a result,
attackers were able to execute or modify various functions on
an ECU. The integration of measures for secure connections
(authentication/integrity) in CAN or Ethernet networks can
minimize the risk for a successful attack by limiting man-
in-the middle attacks. However, there is still the threat of
insider attacks [92], which cannot be prevented by these
measures. In this case, the attacker acts from a compromised
ECU or generally from a network node which is considered
trustworthy by the receivers involved. As a result, no violation
of the security objects (e.g., authenticity or integrity) occurs.
As a result it becomes even more important to implement
the principle of least privileges [93] consistently. Through
the specification of the IAM module of AUTOSAR this
principle is increasingly applied for automotive systems by
capability-based access control methods for services. How-
ever, it should be noted here that a pure specification of
privileges for each service still contains security risks. Due
to the fact that vehicles represent CPSs and therefore operate
in different physical states, this aspect is crucial for access
controls [86]. However, the challenge is to determine the
current state correctly in order to derive appropriate access
decisions based on it. Therefore, the current context has to be
taken into account for the authorization of control commands
for actuators. The future architectures as shown in figure 2
could give an advantage compared with highly distributed
architectures. Since the central computing cluster contains
all sensor/actuator information and executes extensive func-
tional calculations, context analyses could be performed cen-
trally in this cluster.
Another important aspect which should be considered in
access control models is the revocation of privileges. If the
model is based on capabilities, the revocation is much more
difficult compared to ACLs. Transferred to automotive SOAs,
all service privileges are stored in the manifest file according
to the AUTOSAR specification during development or when
adding new services in the life cycle. If the service is rolled
out on different ECUs, each manifest file has to be modified
in case of a revocation. To avoid incorrect configuration of
permissions, it is necessary to verify and validate them suffi-
ciently. The authors Hu et al. published different verification
and test methods for access control policies and models [94].
With capability-based approaches, which are statically based
on pre-defined permissions, verification is easier than with
models such as ABAC, which additionally include various
attribute information for decision making.
VI. CONCLUSION
To sum up the major differences in security between the old
paradigm of signal-orientation and the recent developments
of service-oriented architectures, we see two contrasting
points. On the one hand, SOA is based on switched Ethernet
with its secured protocol stack, which minimizes the attack
surface. Furthermore, physical architectures are developed
with security-by-design in mind and not only focusing on
security by obscurity. On the other hand, the rising dynamics
with regard to data, network connections and software appli-
cations places even stronger demands on vehicular security
mechanisms. From a security point of view, the more is spec-
ified during design time, the less attack surface we have and
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the more we can check and verify during runtime with sim-
ple measures derived from specification. However, without
dynamic deployment of applications, dynamic network paths
or POSIX operating systems, future automotive architectures
will not have the capabilities to follow customer needs of
frequent updates and new features. Hence, dynamic behavior
will rise and thuswe expect that all activemeasures (firewalls,
intrusion detection, access control) will be required in future
service-oriented and hybrid architectures.
But, as the capabilities of firewalls, IDS and access control
mechanisms are developing towards each other, a structured
approach is required for a suitable placement of the mea-
sures that coordinates what data is analyzed where. Such a
system-wide strategy should also be accompanied by threat
modeling results (e.g., [95]). In addition, there are several
countermeasures to ensure certain security properties. How-
ever, it must be analyzed which measures in combination
fulfill automotive boundary conditions (e.g., real-time behav-
ior, bandwidth) most efficiently. Moreover, to capture the
increasing dynamics, sophisticated defense mechanisms are
required. Static rules, thresholds or access lists are no longer
sufficient to defend future vehicles without false alarms or
missed attacks. Contextual information, such as the vehicle
state, environmental behavior, or information regarding exter-
nal interfaces needs to be included in cyber security decisions
and analytics.
VII. FUTURE WORK
In this work, we compared the conventional signal-oriented
architecture of in-vehicle networks with its emerging succes-
sor, the service-oriented or hybrid architecture. We outlined
the challenges with regard to the security of these future
automotive network architectures. Focusing on firewalls, IDS
and access control, we emphasized the need of progressive
defense methods, that need to be combined to ensure vehicu-
lar security with rising dynamics. Suggestions for the security
of an exemplary architecture are given to sketch the chal-
lenges that security architects have to face.
For future research, we see context-aware securitymethods
as a promising direction to cope with the infinite amount of
possible situations, a vehicle may be in. However, to date
it is an unsolved question, what information is necessary
to describe the security context of a vehicle and how this
information is combined optimally with the different security
mechanisms. Additionally, the E/E architecture of the future
will not end at the vehicles external borders, but spans to the
backend systems that can also provide services to the vehi-
cle. Thus, offloading a vehicles security computations may
be a feasible option (e.g., [96], [97]). Furthermore, from a
technological perspective more efficient access controls with
revocation capabilities, intelligent IDS features for encrypted
traffic or high-throughput firewalls for sensory data are an
open topic for research. Today, AUTOSARClassic andAdap-
tive already include some security features, but for the future
this will not be enough. Hence, also sophisticated security
mechanisms to be developed shall ensure their compliance
to AUTOSAR or the standard may have to be extended as
well. In case the eSOC protocol is used in future vehicles,
the protocol should be evaluated more closely with focus on
security.
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